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Abstract 
 
 
The study documents, in general, a significant positive share price response for the 
Hong Kong equity warrants on the announcement date of warrant issues. The result 
concluded that, at least upon the announcement date, is consistent with Schultz (1993) 
and Mayers (1998) where the market view positively to the warrant issues. The out of 
the money warrants further drive the result of announcement effect of the whole sample 
of warrants, giving a more positive and significant price response upon the 
announcement of warrant issues. Firms that issue the out of the money warrant ties 
capital inflow to favourable new related to capital needs of the company and thus 
consistent with Mayers (1998) sequential financing model.  
 
The next stage, a regression analysis model is developed based on the hypothesis of 
information asymmetry for Hong Kong warrant issues. The results, in general, support 
information asymmetry problem arise from the announcement returns, which is 
explained by the information asymmetry variants risk (RISK) and probability of 
conversion (PROB). The in the money warrants model constitute similar result as the 
whole sample, and it further confirmed the information asymmetry by the variant issue 
size (ISSUE), in explaining the announcement effect of ITM warrant issues alone. 
However, none of the variables are significant to explain the announcement effect of the 
OTM warrant issues.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Problems on corporate financing 
 
It is a common practice for listed firm to raise external capital through seasoned offerings 
using variety of instruments such as ordinary equity, debt and hybrid securities such as 
preference shares, convertible bond and warrant debt. However, those firms who require 
raising capital would have to face a number of decisions with a seasoned offering. For 
example, the amount of capital to rise, the type of instrument to use, the method of offer 
and whether to use an underwriter. This paper especially focus on the method of 
financing because the decision would have an impact on the market value of the firm as 
announcements of security issues have been found to cause a significant abnormal 
stock market response.  The method of financing does matter because response varies 
according to type of instrument, method of offer and underwriter use.  
 
The theory of corporate finance, according to Modigliani-Miller approach, is incapable of 
explaining many empirical facts in corporate finance such as the inflexibility in dividend 
policy in relation to financing requirements, the variation in stock price upon the 
announcement of new equity issues or takeover, and limited significance of taxation in 
the deciding the financing patterns.  
 
Nevertheless, the imperfect information approach to corporate financing tries to provide 
consistent explanations for these facts. This approach explores the informational role of 
ILQDQFLDO SROLF\ DFFRUGLQJ WR 6WLJOLW]  ³FKDQJHV LQ ILQDQFLDO SROLF\ PD\ EH DQ
important signal for the reaOSURVSHFWVRIILUP´ 
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The common imperfect information theory in corporate financing includes Myers and 
Majluf (1984) who states that if managers have superior information on firm prospects, 
then adverse selection is associated with new equity issues, as high quality firms are 
pooled with low quality ones. This model, and those that followed, seems to suggest the 
existence of a financing order where agency costs create difference preference between 
internal and external finance (Mayer, 1990), where internally generated funds are always 
preferred to debt and debt is preferred to equity as signal. Moreover, firms experience a 
trade-off between costs of issuing low quality signals with external finance and costs of 
reducing dividend payments to reduce external financing requirement.  
 
1.2 Objective 
 
The objective of this paper is to study the use of warrant as a capital raising instrument 
for firms. Warrant is a security that entitles holders the right to buy common stock of the 
firm at a fixed price for a given period. In Hong Kong, warrants are used to raise capital 
as stand alone instrument and it acts as rising common equity on a delayed action basis. 
Thus, this paper examines the firm specific information: the warrant issues 
announcement, on how warrant financing affects the stock price of the company. The 
next stage we will try to analyze the factors based on information asymmetry hypothesis, 
to explain the announcement effects associated with warrant financing. The sample of 
warrants are further divided into out of the money group (OTM) where exercise price is 
higher than the current price and in the money group (ITM)  where the exercise price is 
lower than the current market price, for investigation.  
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1.3 Results and Implications 
 
The results focus on explaining the difference between the average abnormal return and 
average cumulative abnormal return of the sample warrants in several dimension, 
including relative issue size of warrant, firm size, probability of conversion, growth 
options and change in leverage. The announcement of a warrant issues, in general, 
generate a significant positive share price response of 3.247% the and the OTM 
warrants alone even shows a even more significant positive share price response of 
6.906% on the announcement date (0, +1), which are in contrast to most of the equity 
rights issue evidence. .Moreover, the announcement result is consistent with the models 
of Schultz (1993) and Mayers (1998) where the inclusion of a warrant in a security issue 
is viewed positively by the market. It further suggest that issuance of OTM warrants ties 
capital inflow to favourable news related to capital need of firm, which is consistent with 
Mayers (1998) sequential financing model.  
 
The results of the model developed for Hong Kong warrant issues support the general 
and signaling information asymmetry hypothesis, as proxied by the variants risk (RISK) 
and probability of conversion (PROB). The ITM warrant issues constitute similar result 
as the whole sample, and it further confirmed the information asymmetry by the variant 
issue size of warrant (ISSUE) in explaining the announcement effect of ITM warrant 
issues alone. However, none of the variables are significant to explain the 
announcement effect of the OTM warrant issue.   
 
 
 8 
 
1.4 Outline of the paper  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, the background information of Hong Kong 
warrant market is presented. Literature Review is included in Section 3. Data and data 
description is presented in Section 4. The event study methodology is explained in 
Section 5. The announcement effects of the warrant financing are discussed in Section 6. 
Particularly, this study is more concerned of the aggregate effect of the sample firms, 
and the generalization of this result. Section 7 analyzes the explanations of the 
announcement effects using regression analysis. Limitation is listed on Section 8 and 
finally a summary and conclusions are presented in Section 9.  
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2.  BACKGROUND 
 
2.1 What is warrant?  
 
³:DUUDQW LV VLPSO\ D ORQJ WHUP FDOO RSWLon that entitles holders the right, but not the 
obligation, to buy shares of common stock directly from a company at a fixed price for a 
given period. Each warrant specifies the number of shares of stock that the holder can 
buy, the exercise price, and the expiration date.´%UHDOH\0\HUVDQG$OOHQS 
The price of warrant will be selling at premium or at a discount. Both are discretionary 
and have expiration dates, in which holder can exercise their right before or until maturity 
of the contract7KHZRUG³ZDUUDQW´VLPSO\PHDQVWR³HQGRZZLWKWKHULJKW´ZKLFKLVRQO\
slightly different from the meaning of option. Moreover, warrant are usually attached to 
bonds or preferred stock as sweetener, it allows the warrant issuer to pay lower interest 
rates or dividends. The yield of the bond can be enhanced and make it more attractive to 
outside investors. And warrant can be used as private equity deal. These warrants are 
detachable in which they can be sold independently from bonds and stocks and trade 
freely on secondary market once they are listed. The top three warrant exchanges in the 
world are Deutsche Borse, Switzerland and Hong Kong.  
 
2.2 Different of Warrant and Call Option 
 
)URPWKHKROGHU¶VSRLQWRIYLHZZDUUDQWVDUHVLPLODUWRFDOORSWLRQVRn common stock, in 
which they confer the same rights as call option and they are tradable on secondary 
PDUNHWV+RZHYHU IURP WKH ILUP¶VSRLQWRI YLHZDZDUUDQW LVYHU\GLIIHUHQW IURPDFDOO
RSWLRQ RQ WKH FRPSDQ\¶V FRPPRQ VWRFN 7KH PRVW LPSRUWDQW GLIIHUHnce between call 
options and warrants is that warrants are issued by private parties such as listed 
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corporation or investment bank, and options are issued by public options exchange. 
When a warrant is exercised, a firm must issue new shares of stock. It will thus 
constitute dilution effect to the shares because each time a warrant is exercised, then 
the number of shares outstanding increases. Conversely, investors will only receive 
existing shares from an assigned call writer upon exercise of call option. And unlike 
common stock shares outstanding, warrants do not have voting rights.  
 
2.3 Hong Kong equity warrant market 
  
For Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx), listed equity warrants include the regular equity 
warrant and the derivative equity warrants. Derivative equity warrants different from the 
equity warrant in the sense that they do not have dilution effect because a third party 
rather the company of the underlying stock issues them, and they may settle their 
obligation through cash payment rather than physical delivery of the underlying asset. 
 
2.3.1 Special Features 
The Hong Kong market provides a comparative capital raising environment as it has a 
number of different operating and structural features to US market. In terms of equity 
warrant issues, a rights issue is the most common method in Hong Kong whereas public 
issue is more common in US. Rights issues imply issuing rights to a company's existing 
shareholders to buy a proportion of number of additional shares at a given price within a 
fixed period, while public issues imply the sale of equity shares by a firm to the public in 
order to raise funds for business use. In Hong Kong, the rights issue price is set at 
announcement of the issue compared to the US where price is set just prior to the issue 
opening or the start of rights trading. Further, underwriting contracts in Hong Kong are 
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always standby agreements where the underwriter agrees to purchase any shortfall in 
the warrant issues after the warrant issues have closed. The US market predominantly 
uses a firm commitment contract where the underwriter purchases the issue and 
responsible for the sale of the securities to the public. 
 
The warrants agreement often contains option-like characteristics, such as callability and 
extendibility, which increase PDQDJHUV¶ FRQWURO RYHU ILQDQFLDO GHFLVLRQ &DOODELOLW\ DW D
nominal price is one feature, and typically is used to force conversion. Schultz (1993) 
empirically examines conversion-forcing calls of warrants and concludes that warrants 
are called optimally. Schultz reports a 3% decline in stock price in response to the call 
announcement. Extendibility is another option-like warrant feature. Extendibility allows 
managers to extend the life of warrant issue. Howe and Wei (1993) report that warrants 
increase in value in response to the extension announcements, and that stock prices 
also respond positively to such announcement.  
 
2.3.2 Motives of analyzing the equity warrants 
The target of analysis in this paper is the regular equity warrants. As shown in Table 1, 
the equity warrants had occupied a substantial role in warrant market from the mid-20th 
century to early 21st century, especially in the poor financial year 1995, 1999 and 2001; it 
occupied more than half of the total number of warrant listings. It provides a fairly 
reasonable ground to believe that companies are quite reliance on equity warrant 
financing at the period. 
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Table 1: Market capitalization and turnover of equity warrants, 2003-2009 
 
Equity Warrants 
Year/Month 
Number of 
Equity 
Warrants 
Total number 
of warrants in 
the market 
% of number 
of equity 
warrants 
Market value 
(HK$million) 
Turnover 
value 
(HK$million) 
1995 161 244 65.98 6536.62 15236.75 
1996 156 375 41.60 15334.49 35030.87 
1997 187 533 35.08 7263.06 60242.67 
1998 129 271 47.60 1070.41 2472.65 
1999 100 192 52.08 4877.84 10384.93 
2000 89 291 30.58 2573.18 8046.72 
2001 74 96 77.08 2357.12 3129.59 
2002 67 414 16.18 1081.99 1745.15 
2003 45 575 7.83 1316.40 1156.90 
2004 32 895 3.58 2316.95 2920.69 
2005 27 1331 2.03 1156.84 2283.25 
2006 27 1986 1.36 3991.91 2711.69 
2007 30 4513 0.66 6873.37 5099.36 
2008 34 3045 1.12 548.52 1130.25 
2009 25 3392 0.74 1103.37 524.07 
 
 
Despite the decreasing popularity of the equity warrant in the warrant market, it provides 
a substantial means for companies to raise capital upfront. The increasing popularity in 
derivative warrants only favor investors to earn quick money, but giving no benefit to 
company of the underlying stock. Those firms that issue equity warrants usually may 
need a small amount of capital upfront to fund an exploration program, and the 
excessive large amount of financing needs in the future depends on the outcome of the 
exploration program. Mayer (1998) asserts that warrant financing can help firms to raise 
a small amount of capital upfront for immediate financing needs and avoids the possible 
agency conflict of free cash flow associated with a large amount of upfront capital rising.  
Mayer (1998) also states that the additional transaction cost of further equity associated 
with a small upfront equity raising can be avoid by warrant issuance. It also provides 
investors an alternative means to invest in the company. If an exploration program is 
successful and additional funds are needed to exploit the program, the share price 
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should increase, the warrants are exercised and new funds are raised through the issue 
of equity.  
 
Previously, we state that the corporate choice of financing method would influence the 
ILUP¶VYDOXHZKLFKLVPDLQO\GXHWRWKHLPSHUIHFWinformation problem. This paper aims at 
analysis the abnormal return associated with warrant financing and to determine whether 
there are any information asymmetry based factors may explain such returns. It helps to 
explain the effects of equity warrant financing and serve as a reference to determine 
whether it is beneficial for corporations to issue warrant for financing in the future.  
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3. LITERATURE REWIEW 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This paper concerns the impact of warrant issues events as a capital raising instrument 
using the event study approach. It examines the announcement effect of warrant issues 
and determines the reasons for the announcement effect. Therefore, it seems 
appropriate to divide the literature relevant to this paper into four categories ± papers 
that concern the theory of event studies, paper that discuss behavioral finance which 
may contribute reasonable level of relevance to our study, the main ideas focus on 
papers that discuss theories of firm financing and papers that involve measuring the 
announcement effect of warrant financing to the financial market.  
 
3.2  Event Studies  
3.2.1 Origin of Event Studies  
Marcus, Kane and Bodie (2008, p366) defines that "an event study describes a 
technique of empirical financial research that enables an observer to assess the impact 
of a particular HYHQW RQ D ILUP¶V VWRFN SULFH." The general method of event studies is 
abnormal return which is estimated against anticipated and actual share returns.   
 
$FFRUGLQJWRWKHDUWLFOH³7KH$GMXVWPHQWRI6WRFN3ULFHVWR1HZ,QIRUPDWLRQ´RULJLQDOO\
introduced by Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969), event study methodology is a 
commonly used statistical method to define how new firm specific, or market-wide 
information effects to the performance indicators of the firm. It is used especially in 
accounting, economics and finance related studies (Binder 1998).  
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A traditional event study focuses on corporate events and their impact on the value of 
firm or its share price. Events such as buy-back, split, right issue, merger and acquisition, 
spin-off and leverage buyout, etc. have been studied in academia since 1969. A 
traditional event study would normally involve the following steps:  
 
1. To identify the event of interest and defining an event window 
2. To select a set of cases to include in the analysis 
3. To predict a normal return during the event window in the absence of the event 
4. To estimate the cumulative abnormal outcome, this defined as the difference 
between the actual and predicted returns during the event window 
5. To test whether the cumulative abnormal return is statistically different from zero.  
 
In this paper, the procedure for the research is very similar to a traditional event study. 
However, here the focus is on both abnormal return and cumulative abnormal return, 
which are generally defined as the difference between the actual and predicted returns. 
The predicted returns in this warrant issues event study are obtained from the market 
regression model, which assumes linear relationship between the return of the stock and 
WKHPDUNHWSRUWIROLR8VXDOO\WKHFRXQWU\¶V,QGH[RQWKHVWRFNPDUNHWFDQEHXVHGDVD
proxy for the market portfolio. Therefore, it is possible to predict the return of the security 
based on the movement of its market.  
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3.2.2 Arguments related to Event studies  
 
Originally the reason for the use of the event study method was to study how quickly 
new information could be seen to have incorporated in the stock price, and this way 
examine whether markets were efficient (Malkiel, 2003.) Moreover, Bartholdy, Olson and 
Peare (2007) also argued these researches are normally designed to examine changes 
of abnormal price in security over the period from various events. But the key point of 
this process is to determine the factors of abnormal performance but ignore the 
institutional setting. Therefore, the possible drawbacks concern about efficiency when 
XVHGE\VPDOOVWRFNPDUNHWVVXFKDVOHDNDJHRILQIRUPDWLRQGXHWR³LQVLGHULQIRUPDWLRQ´ 
 
Furthermore, Lamdin (2001) argue that the standard approach of event studies is to 
focus on contemporaneous market reaction to news; however, whether the market 
response was warranted is rarely questioned. And Reynolds (2006) also states that a 
well-specified event study may be able to reveal how investors think a policy will impact 
a firm, however, these expectations may be poor predictors of the true impact. 
 
3.3 Behavioral finance  
3.3.1 The Concepts of Behavioral Finance 
The concept of behavioral finance demonstrates an intuition idea behind this paper as it 
drives the behavior of potential investors and warrants issuers on the announcement 
effect. Many empirical studies have been established for behavioral finance. The key 
idea of behavioral finance, according to Külpmann (2004), is that additional variables 
that capture investor psychology are important to explain share price movements in the 
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stock market. Shleifer (2000) defines behavioral finance as the study of human fallibility 
in competitive markets. Akerlof (2003) also states that market anomalies can be 
explained by behavioral finance theory because it can capture the psychological and 
sociological impacts on the stock market. Reilly & Brown (2003) further claim that 
behavioral finance explains the various psychological characteristics of individuals, and 
how these characteristics affect how they act as investors, analysts, and portfolio 
managers. Reilly & Brown (2003, p.202) states that "the major contributions of 
behavioral finance are both explanations for some of the anomalies discovered by prior 
academic research, and opportunities to derive abnormal rates of return by acting upon 
some of the deeply ingrained biases of investors." Rather than assuming all participants 
in the market are rational according to the capital market theories, however, behavioral 
finance theory assumes that all market participants are irrational (Avramov and Chordia, 
2006).  
 
3.3.2 Arguments of Behavioral Finance 
Frankfurter, G M. and McGoun, E G. (2002) argues that behavioral finance is 
dependent on the behavior of practitioners. Ritter (2003) stated one of the major 
problems of behavioral finance regards what bias will be chosen for emphasis, 
market participant can predict either over or under-reaction, in which this problem 
can be known as model dredging. Malkiel (2003) argued that assumption of 
market participants making rational financial decisions based on sufficient market 
information are simply a nonexistent ideal. He offered historical evidence to 
prove that people follow their emotions and hearts rather than their reason and 
minds. Therefore, it results in two different arguments on behavioral finance. One 
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argument is that irrational investors are not sufficient to cover capital markets 
inefficient; the other argument is that in practice prices do not match intrinsic 
value. If prices match intrinsic value, then there are no easy profit opportunities. 
However, the reverse does not hold. It is because if arbitrage activity is limited, 
then absence of abnormal profit opportunities does not imply that market is 
efficient.  
 
3.3.3 Information processing biases 
According to Bodie, Kane and Marcus (2008), there are four types of errors in 
information processing that lead to investors misestimate the true probabilities of 
possible events or associated rates of return. Firstly, the forecasting errors: investors 
prefer recent experience rather than previous beliefs when making forecasts that are full 
of uncertainty. For instance high P/E ratio usually means high earnings expectations, but 
it can be caused by poor subsequent earning performance. Secondly, overconfidence: 
since investors usually overestimates their abilities and beliefs. Barber and Odean (2001) 
explain such phenomenon by stating that trading of men is more active than women due 
to greater overconfidence of men. Thirdly, conservatism: It means investors react slowly 
to new evidence. They under react to news about a firm, thus prices will fully reflect new 
information only gradually. Lastly, sample size neglect and representativeness: a small 
sample is just as representative of a population at large in order to infer a pattern based 
on a small sample and predicted trends.  
 
Recent studies empirically examine two predicts that arise from such information 
processing biases: (1) overconfidence in private information; and (2) overconfidence in 
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less reliable information and under-confidence in more reliable information. In the former 
case, Daniel et al. (1998) and Fischer (2001) demonstrate that drift can arise when 
investors overreact to their private information, coupled with self-attribution biases. As a 
result of their overconfidence, these investors overweight their private information and 
underweight public information such as earnings reports or public announcement. 
 
The latter case, drift arise IURP LQYHVWRUV¶ XQGHU-reaction to reliable information. Griffin 
and Tversky (1992) hypothesize that investors focus on the strength of extremeness of 
the available evidence and with insufficient regard for the reliability of information could 
have explain the pattern of over-confidence and under-confidence observed in human 
behavior. It predicts that investors tend to under-react to information that is relatively 
more reliable. Thus, more drift occurs when the information is more reliable.  
 
3.4 Theories and findings on capital rising through warrant issues 
 
3.4.1  Theories of firm financing 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) show that, in perfect capital market, with the assumptions 
that there are no presence of asymmetric information problem, and with no contracting 
costs or taxes, the cash flows to its most efficient use and the cost of capital is 
determined by its business alone, then the corporate financing is irrelevant to the firm 
value and the cost of capital. However, these assumptions hardly extend to the real 
world, in fact, firms may find that there are restrictions to their access to external 
financing, and the costs of alternative forms of external finance may differ. Under such 
market imperfections, firms will attempt to select levels of debt and equity in order to 
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reach an optimal debt equity mix of its capital structure (Bevan and Danbolt, 2002). And 
several empirical evidences also suggest that financing does matter. 
 
)LUP¶V ILQDQFLDO VWUDWHJ\ DLPV WR GHWHUPLQH WKH RSWLPDO FDSLWDO VWUXFWXUH which has an 
LPSOLFDWLRQ RQ ILUP¶V EHKDYLRU 7KH WZR ZHOO-known theories of capital structure, the 
trade-off theory and pecking order theory, has been developed to explain the financing 
choice of firms.  
 
The trade-off theory is rational in explaining the firm capital structure as a mix of debt 
and equity; firms have to trade-off between the bankruptcy risks generated from debt, 
with the gains from value-enhancing tax savings. Since interest is tax deductible, and 
thus a firm with more debt that pays interest on debt would in turn pay lower taxes 
because of the interest tax shield. The value of firm increases with higher debt level of 
firm, and the after-tax payment to the owners of firms also increases with a greater 
proportion of debt to equity financing (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980). However, benefit 
always comes at cost, the higher financial distress cost from debt will trigger a greater 
potential threat of bankruptcy risk and higher agency costs (Myers, 1977), in which they 
both raise the cost of capital. Direct bankruptcy cost would result when there is a default 
on its debt obligations and in which it affects the liquidation value of firm (Harris and 
Raviv, 1991). Also, indirect cost would result when shareholders lose confidence in the 
viability of the firm (Titman and Wessels, 1988). Therefore, a firm has to strike for the 
balance between the cost and benefits of its debt equity mix. 
 
The pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Myers, 1984) suggests that firms 
have a priority preference in financing sources, which first use internal funds, then 
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followed by external debt, and resort to issue of equity last. The theory was developed 
under the asymmetric information assumption and the assumed effective management. 
The priority of three finance sources was based on the increasing transaction cost from 
retained earning to equity. If internal funds are insufficient to finance the capital 
investment requirements, then firms prefer issuing debt prior to equity. Since with 
external debt, the information asymmetry problem is less severe between managers and 
new shareholders than that of external equity financing. The equity holders will request 
for higher rate of return due to the more severe information asymmetry problem between 
the managers and share holders. As a result, internal financing is the cheapest source, 
followed by debt financing and then at last is the external equity financing. However, the 
overall evidence supporting this theory has been mixed based on the studies of the large 
established firms (Helwege and Liang, 1996; Frank and Goyal, 2003). 
 
3.4.2  Asymmetric Information problem with capital rising 
Agency costs problem arise due to the existence of information asymmetry in large 
corporation. Such costs arise due to the conflict of interest between the objectives of 
shareholders and managers (Fama, 1980). Managers pursue investment strategies only 
if they are beneficial to them such as it helps in increasing their tenure, compensation as 
well as empire building (Jensen, 1986). To achieve these goals, managers may pursue 
investment strategies at the expense of shareholder value, and thus these firms would 
favor debt over equity. However, due to the difference in nature of external equity 
financing, agency problem do not exist for very small venture. For large firms, issuance 
of equity for large corporations, the capital provides from shareholders who generally do 
not involved in the day to day operations of firm. On the contrary, equity financing for 
start-up firm implies private equity or venture capital. Generally, those capital suppliers, 
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the so-called venture capitalists, are heavily involved in the daily operations of the firm 
and as a result the agency problem in these firms is minimized.  
For small startup firms, adverse selection problems are one of the fundamental problems 
that arise due to the existence of asymmetric information problems. Those small firms 
may not be able to signal outside investors about their future prospects of firm, and thus 
profitable investment opportunities may be forgone (Myers and Maljuf, 1984). 
Furthermore, small firms usually are not transparent in operations, a lack of track record 
by which to judge the firm, their size and the central role of management in operation, 
making credible signaling of small firms become difficult (Cassar, 2004). And as a result, 
small firm venture may become difficult in the nascent stages of the firm (Manigart and 
Struyf, 1997, Cassar, 2004), especially for external financing without a concrete 
signaling to the outside investors, for example, the information on the ownership of 
intellectual property.  
Moreover, based on the pecking order theory and information asymmetry both predict 
that small startup firm should used up internal finances first, followed by debt and then 
external equity. However, despite the financing preference as suggested theoretically, 
Berger and Udell (2003) show the importance of debt financing for small and high growth 
startup corporations. The theory indicates that at the nascent stages, small corporations 
would adopt internal financing first, followed by external sources, while the estimation on 
the optimal debt-equity portion is unclear. In reality however, due to the constraints on 
available resources faced by firms, most of the firms may primarily rely on the external 
debt financing.  
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3.4.3 Seasoned equity offerings  
Most existing evidence on the seasoned capital raising process has concentrated on 
pure equity and debt issues in the US market. Some studies also examined the 
announcement effect of hybrid securities in UK, Japanese, French and Dutch markets. 
However, only limited evidence focused on the impact of equity offerings in other 
international markets including Europe and the Asia Pacific region. Smith (1986) 
examined the theory and evidence related to announcements of hybrid security such as 
convertible debt and preference shares offered by public corporations. He concluded 
that the average stock price reactions to public security issues are either negative or not 
significantly different from zero. Similar results are found for French issues (Gajewski 
and Ginglinger, 2002) where it shows that the market reaction to the announcement of 
seasoned equity issues is significantly negative for rights issues and insignificantly 
negative for public offerings. In contrast, Kang and Stulz (1996) and Cooney et al.  (1998) 
support a positive or at least non-negative stock price reaction to the announcement of 
new equity issues by Japanese corporations.  
 
Unit offerings, such as bundles of common stock and warrants were sold together as 
package but traded separately in the secondary market, are one of the common 
methods to raise equity in the market. Units offering are more common in initial public 
offering, but they are still sometimes used in seasoned equity offerings (Byoun and 
Moore, 2003).  
 
Several advantages of unit offerings arise to both shareholders and company. It allow 
firms pre-engage to yet another seasoned offering at the exercise price of the warrants,  
thus giving the subscriber the right to buy further underlying shares at a pre-defined 
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exercise price and period.  On the other hand, firms issue warrants can effectively have 
equity financing in stages and result in high gross proceeds under certain conditions. 
This sequential financing may reduce agency costs resulting from potential free cash 
flow (Schultz, 1993), and can be perceived as a positive signal of the future performance 
of firms because the next stage financing is conditional on share price appreciation 
(Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1997). In addition, firms use unit offerings, such as warrant, 
as a tool to increase the probability of success of a seasoned offering because warrants 
can be considered as a sweetener. Thus, issuance of warrant can induce incentive of 
investors to raise interest in new offerings as well as to increase the subscription rate.  
 
However, warrant financing is still debatable. Despite the benefit as stated above, 
warrants may complicate the offering and result in high flotation costs. Furthermore, the 
exercise of warrants in the future may affect firms losing control on the choice of the 
issue price and the timing of the next equity offering. Due to the potential drawbacks 
arise from warrant issues, there is still no clear evidence to conclude why firms choose 
to issue seasoned offerings with warrants rather than issue common stock offering. 
 
3.5 Announcement effect of warrant issuance on financial market 
3.5.1 Similar market response to option Introduction 
Since warrant and option has several similar characteristics, some research on option 
introduction may therefore, to a certain extend, explains the warrant listings effect. For 
example several studies such as Conrad (1989) and Detemple and Jorion (1990), they 
examined the option introduction effect on the returns of the underlying security. Conrad 
(1989) confirmed that the share price of optioned-stock will increase permanently but it 
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will decrease with volatility. Such price effect is associated with the listing date, but not 
with the announcement date. In addition, Detemple and Jorion (1990) further confirms 
that the optioned stock will have a significant increase in price. Besides, Sorescu (2000) 
shows that the two-regime switching means model will affect the price of the share 
during option introduction, he concluded that positive abnormal return results for options 
listing during 1973-1980 and negative abnormal returns results for options listed 1981 
and after. Recently, Chan and Wei (2001) had examined the Hong Kong warrant market; 
they found that hedging effect of warrant issue triggers a significant increase in the 
underlying stock prices both before and during the announcement date of warrant 
issuance, and there are no significant effects around the dates when the warrants are 
traded. Moreover, they further concluded that the prices of warranted stocks are 
basically flat after the announcement and it implies that the information effect of warrant 
issuance is weak to the public investors. And Chan and Wu (2001) have the similar 
finding which shows that the introduction of warrant leads to positive and permanent 
price effect.  
 
3.5.2  Warrant issues response as equity financing 
There are many well known theoretical models that predict a negative share price 
response to equity issues. For example, Myers and Majluf (1984) predict that new equity 
issues will convey negative information. He concluded that management has tendency 
to rely on internal sources of funds, and to prefer debt to equity if external financing is 
required. Because it is assumed that managers know more about the firm's value than 
potential investors. Investors interpret the firm's actions rationally. But corporate 
managers are more likely to issue securities only when the market value of the firm is 
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RYHUSULFHGFRPSDUHGWRWKHPDQDJHPHQW¶VDVVHVVPHQWRIWKHLUYDOXH The implication is 
that that the stock price effects of security issues will be greater when the asymmetry 
information effect is more severe between insiders and outside investors.  [Myers and 
Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984)].  
  
Ross (1977) and Heinkel (1VXJJHVWWKDWFKDQJHVLQOHYHUDJHVLJQDOPDQDJHPHQW¶V
inside information about expected changes in future firm performance. In fact, firms may 
find that there are restrictions to their access to external financing, and the costs of 
alternative forms of external finance may differ. Furthermore, Ross (1977) state that the 
Modigliani-Miller theorem on the irrelevancy of financial structure implicitly assumes that 
the market possesses full information about the activities of firms. And Heinkel (1982) 
also state that firms raise debt and equity capital to finance a positive net present value 
project in perfectly competitive capital markets. So, if managers possess inside 
information, however, the managerial incentive and its financial structure signals 
information to the market, and investors will attempt to design financing mixes of debt 
and equity that eliminate the adverse incentives of insiders and correctly price securities.  
 
 
Furthermore, Harris and Raviv (1990) and Stulz (1990) develop agency models where 
leverage is positively associated with firm value. In terms of operating decision, Harris 
and Raviv DVVXPHWKDWPDQDJHUVDOZD\VZDQW WRFRQWLQXHWKH ILUP¶VFXUUHQWRSHUDWLRQ
even if liquidation is preferred by investors. Thus, only debt can mitigate the problem by 
giving the investors (debt holders) the option to force liquidation if cash flow is poor. The 
optimal capital structure is determined by trading off improved liquidation decision versus 
higher investigation costs. Higher liquidation value or firms with lower investigation costs 
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will have more debt and will be more likely to default but will have higher market value 
than similar firms with lower liquidation value and/or higher investigation costs. The 
intuition for the higher debt level is that increases in liquidation value make it more likely 
that liquidation is the best strategy. Using the constant returns to scale assumption they 
show that the debt level relative to expected firm income and default probability are 
independent of firm size. Combining these results, Harris and Raviv (1990) argue that 
higher leverage can be expected to be associated with larger firm value, higher debt 
level relative to expected income.  
 
However, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) suggest an optimal capital structure model 
ZKHUHFKDQJHVLQWKHILUP¶VH[SHFWHGFDVKIORZVLQGXFHSRVLWLYHO\FRUUHODWHGFKDQJHVLQ
optimal leverage levels and thus a decrease in the leverage is a negative signal of firm 
value. Through Modigliani and Miller (1958) claimed that the value of firm would remain 
XQFKDQJHGLQGLIIHUHQWFDSLWDOVWUXFWXUHDQGFRQFOXGHGWKDWµFDSLWDOVWUXFWXUHLVLUUHOHYDQW¶
Nevertheless, many studies, such as the work of Lubatkin and Chatterjee (1994), argued 
that firm value was affected by the different capital structure. 
 
3.5.3 Right issue of warrants 
In Hong Kong, which is similar to Australia market, stand alone equity warrants are 
issued as rights offerings (Suchard, 2005). Rights issues of equity usually trigger 
negative share price response but with smaller magnitude than public offerings (Byoun 
and Moore, 2003). +DQVHQ DQG 3LQNHUWRQ¶V  argue that due to the problem of 
selection bias, firms can enjoy the direct flotation cost advantage of non-underwritten 
right offering only if they have concentrated ownership, because the number of potential 
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buyers in an issue declines, so do direct costs such as printing expense, transfers fees, 
and marketing costs. In contrast, Eckbo and Masulis (1992) find that the floatation cost 
differential persists after controlling foUWKHLVVXHU¶VRZQHUVKLSVWUXFWXUH7KH\DUJXHWKDW
the lack of underwriter certification will lead to costly rights offering due to the increasesd 
adverse selection costs implied by the Myers and Majluf (1984) model, which predict that 
the stock prices will respond negatively to announcements of equity issues because the 
market assumes that managers have incentives to issue overvalued stock. The 
presence of underwriters can thus reduce the information disparity between issuing 
ILUP¶VPDQDJHUDQGRXWVLGHLQvestors.  
 
However, several differences are found between rights issues of equity and rights issues 
of warrants. Gitman (2003) argues that although both rights issues of equity and rights 
issues of warrants result in new equity capital, the warrant provides for deferred equity 
financing. Also, even the rights issues of equity have the option and dilution effect as 
warrant had, these aspects are considered to have limited importance. Furthermore, the 
rights issues of equity are usually offered at a discount to the current market price so the 
rights are likely to be exercised. As long as shareholders take up their rights, their 
shareholdings are not diluted. In contrast, warrant issues tend to be issued at a premium 
to the current market price. The current shareholdings have the potential to be 
significantly diluted if the warrants are exercised while the VKDUHKROGHUV GRQ¶W WDNH XS
their allocation of warrants. (Gitman, 2003) 
 
3.5.4 Warrant issues response as attached to debt financing 
Conflicting announcement effect evidence for warrant debt financing is provided by 
Phelps and Roenfeldt (1991) who find a significant negative share price response. They 
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found that stock price reacts to warrant-debt unit financing announcements with a 
significant two day average abnormal return. The negative average abnormal return is 
similar to that observed for convertible debt financing announcements in previous 
research. Phelps and Roenfeldt (1991) further assert that warrant-debt financing 
decisions result in large increases in capitalization; on average, issuers' long-term debt 
increases by 84 percent, and common shares outstanding increase by 18 percent 
assuming full exercise of the warrants. Meanwhile, Billingsley et al. (1990), Kang and 
Stulz (1996) and De Roon and Veld (1998) find an insignificant stock price reaction. 
However, Byoun and Moore (2003) find that public issues of stock-warrant units have a 
similar mean significant negative announcement return to straight equity issues. 
However, there is a difference in the median returns. Byoun and Moore (2003) suggest 
that this provides some evidence of a less severe price reaction to stock-warrant 
offerings compare to straight equity issues. 
 
Previous studies mainly focused on stock warrant issues in an IPO and convertible debt 
financing to illustrate the impact of warrants. Schultz (1993) states that stock-warrant 
issuance is a multistage financing actions in which it will reduce agency costs of free 
cash flows. Jensen and Meckling (1976) also assert that because managers only 
capture a fraction of gain from their profit enhancement activities, but they do bear the 
entire cost of these activities, it creates conflict of interest between shareholders and 
managers. Thus, managers of the firm may pay less effort in managing company 
resources and may focus their own personal benefit by consuming perquisites such as 
plush offices, building empires, corporate jets. As a result manager may overindulge in 
the above pursuits but less concern about maximizing firm value. The way to solve this 
is to increase the debt financing portion of firm so as to increase the manager's share of 
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the equity in order to mitigate the loss from the conflict between the manager and 
shareholders. Jensen (1986) further says that debt commits the firm to pay out cash, 
thus the reduction of the amount of free cash flow available to managers will reduce the 
likelihood for them to engage in the above pursuits. Such benefit of debt is believed to 
effectively mitigate the conflict between managers and equity holders. Therefore, if 
warrant is attached to equity offing, it can remove the incentive of managers towards 
squander excess cash flow. Also, through the conversion of warrants, it can secure 
future funding for their profit maximizing business activities. One of the desirable 
features of issuing warrant for financing is that they can provide funds up front when the 
firm needs capital in short term. 
 
 
Mayers (1998) argues that when warrants are issued with debt or equity, it can be 
advantageous when a real investment option exists. Sequential financing increases 
issue costs but helps control overinvestment incentives that can arise if financing is 
SURYLGHG SULRU WR DQ LQYHVWPHQW RSWLRQ¶V PDWXULW\ Bhagat and Frost (1986) shows 
evidence of economies of scale in issuance costs, so there is incentive to avoid smaller 
multiple issues. Thus, firms would like to include warrants as an instrument to hedge 
against incurring additional cost of issuing debt or equity. Moreover, the models 
suggested by Mayers (1998) examined that issuing warrant with debt or equity would 
generate positive impact to firm. Therefore, stock-warrant issue and by extension 
warrant issuance alone should have less severe negative impact than straight equity 
issue upon announcement.    
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Through some argument in support of warrant financing, there exists several theoretical 
and empirical studies that have generated many results to support the hypothesis of 
negative stock price reaction to warrant debt financing decisions. According to the 
signalling model set forth by Miller and Rock (1985), he believes that external financing 
may reveal low current, and hence future, earnings. Even if the market takes announced 
financing as a clue to unobserved earnings, temptations arise to run up the price by 
engaging in less outside financing than the market was expecting, the market will 
eventually realize the truth and the price will presumably fall back as predicted by Miller 
and Modigliani (1958). On the other hand, since management is assumed to know more 
about the ILUP¶VYDOXH WKDQSRWHQWLDO LQYHVWRUVDn external financing decision involving 
equity options, such as warrants in our analysis, may therefore reveal that management 
perceives equity to be overpriced, resulting in a price decline (Myers and Majluf,1984). 
Besides that, warrant exercise may increase the total number of outstanding shares 
upon exercise of warrant and thus result in reduced voting rights concentration of the 
shareholders, thereby making the firm a more difficult acquisition target (Stulz,1988). 
The reduction in share price upon warrant issuance announcement may also due to 
additional cash inflows to the firm from warrant exercise as suggested by Jensen (1986). 
At last, issuance of warrants also can decrease ownership concentration, revealing 
pessimism on the part of management and results in negative signal to the market 
(Leland and Pyle,1977).  
 
Nonetheless, positive stock price reactions may result from warrant debt financing due to 
the value of interest tax shields (Modigliani and Miller,1963). As the trade-off theory 
suggests, the financial distress costs and an offset between increasing tax savings with 
increasing bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy costs. In other words, the increase in tax rate 
 32 
 
should increase WKHGHEWSURSRUWLRQRIWKHILUPV¶capital structure. It suggests an optimal 
capital structure is determined by the trade-off between the cost of financial distress and 
the benefit from deductible interest. The theory is supported by many studies including 
the work by Givoly, Hayn, Ofer and Sarig (1992) and MacKie-Mason (1990). Beside, the 
debt component of a warrant-debt issue requires fixed cash flow payments during the life 
of the debt. The increase in fixed payments may convey managerial optimism 
(Ross,1977) and a reduction in free cash flow (Jensen,1986), where both may lead to a 
positive price reaction.  However, if the firm faces a downward sloping demand curve for 
its shares, price pressure will be created in short term due to the impending increase in 
outstanding share from warrant issuance, or the long term effect due to the imperfect 
VXEVWLWXWLRQIRUILUP¶VVKDUHZKHUHERWKZLOOOHDGWRWKHUHGXFWLRQLQVKDUHSULFH+DUULV
and Gurel,1986).  
 
In short, the information asymmetry problem constitutes the fundamental problems on 
warrant financing. Investors usually treat warrant financing as deferred equity financing 
which is usually view negatively by investors. Most International studies such as France 
shows a negative market response on equity issues, but Japan shows a positive market 
response on equity issues.  Various arguments of warrant financing based on its 
announcement effect on the financial market have been discussed. The negativity 
mainly due to managerial incentive of issuing overvalued stock while the positively 
mainly arise from the interest tax shield from deft financing.  
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4. DATA AND DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
4.1 Data 
 
The data analyzed in this study consists of sample of equity warrants identified from 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx). The original dataset consists of the observation of 
a sample of 35 equity call warrants that are listed on the Exchange between June 2003 
and December 2009. The dataset specifies the first announcement date of warrant 
issuance when the offer documents are released to the market. To investigate the 
market reaction on the announcement of warrant issuance, a comprehensive search for 
data including issue detail, financial report data, share prices and trading volume were 
identified from various sources such as HKEx Fact Books, warrant offer documents, 
online company reports, press release and company announcements. From the original 
dataset, 5 firms were excluded for lack of trading data, 1 had missing announcement 
data. Therefore altogether, the final sample consists of 29 announcement events, issued 
by a total of 26 firms during June 2003 and December 2009. Besides, the underlying 
VKDUHV¶ daily closing prices are extracted from the Datastream online database. The 
Datastream online database also provides data on the Hang Seng Index and the dollar 
value of the market turnover. (Details of companies are listed in Appendix 1) 
 
4.2 Industry and use of funds 
 
Warrants are suitable forms of financing especially for those firms which tends to have 
sequential financing needs. The sample of warrants mainly comprises of industrial, 
telecommunication firms, and properties sectors, in total accounts for almost 80% of the 
sample (See Table 2). Firms use the funds for variety purpose, 3.5% are to be used for a 
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VSHFLILF SURMHFW  IRU HQKDQFLQJ ILUP¶V ZRUNLQg capital and 24.1% for both 
repayment of debt and strengthening the working capital base of firm.  
 
Table 2: Sample Warrants Issuers Classified According to Industry 
 
Industry Name   Number of firms  Proportion 
     
Finance   1  3.85% 
Consolidated enterprise  2  7.69% 
Properties  5  19.23% 
Industrial  7  26.92% 
Travel and Hotels  2  7.69% 
Telecommunication  6  23.08% 
Miscellaneous  3  11.54% 
     
     
Total  26  100.00% 
          
 
 
4.3 Descriptive statistics for the sample of warrants 
 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics regarding the issues and issuer characteristics 
and the impact on financial structure for the sample of warrants. The whole sample 
consists of 16 (55%) of the warrants were ITM at the announcement date while 13 (45%) 
of warrants were OTM. The dollar proceeds are in terms of Hong Kong dollars. 
 
The OTM warrant issuers proceeds larger relative issue size and ITM warrant issuers. 
The whole sample warrants have raised 630 million of capital upfront given the average 
firm size is 17662 million, which constitute 17.9% average relative issue size. The OTM 
warrants has an average issue size of 21.8% compared to that of ITM 14.7%. Meanwhile, 
its firm size is six times larger than that of ITM warrants issue firms. The figures may 
suggest that large firms tend to issue OTM warrants in order to raise a larger proportion 
of upfront capital for exploration program. 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for 29 equity warrants issued by firms listed in the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange during June 2003 to December 2009. 
 
The whole sample shows the mean and median of issue discount are estimated to be 1. 
On average, the OTM warrants are issued at premium of 21.8% while the ITM warrants 
are issued at discount of 18%. The higher probability of conversion of ITM warrants may 
LPSO\ WKDW LQYHVWRUV KDYH D EHWWHU H[SHFWDWLRQ DERXW ILUPV¶ IXWXUH SURVSHFW UHVXOW LQ
higher likelihood to exercise the warrant contracts, compare to OTM warrants.  
 
  Whole sample  OTM warrants  ITM warrants 
  Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median 
Shares per warrant  4.39 5.00  5.23 5.00  3.71 2.70 
Warrant price  2.49 1.03  4.47 2.50  0.88 0.46 
Years to expiration  1.71 1.50  1.83 2.00  1.60 1.50 
Gross Proceedsa  
(000000)  630 300  1062 392  280 160 
Issue Sizeb  0.179 0.173  0.218 0.224  0.147 0.168 
Firm Sizec (000000)  17662 1630  33127 6352  5098 587 
Risk of firmd  0.043 0.032  0.035 0.027  0.050 0.038 
Growth of Firme  2.035 1.023  2.172 1.023  1.923 0.964 
Issue discountf  0.998 1.000  1.218 1.145  0.820 0.902 
Probability of conversiong 0.108 0.018  0.098 0.025  0.116 0.017 
Change in leverageh  1.566 1.012  1.927 0.848  1.272 1.075 
          
a
 gross proceeds = No. of warrants issued × warrant price 
 
b
 Issue size = gross proceeds divided by market value of  equity 
 
c market value of equity = number of shares outstanding at last balance date × closing  
price of shares the  day before the announcement 
 
d
 standard derivation of the OLS estimates of the market model over (-250,-11) 
 
e Growth of firm = market value of equity / Book value of equity. Book value measured at   
the financial year end pre the issue announcement 
 
f Exercise price of warrant / share price pre the announcement 
 
g Log of the share price over the exercise price as a percentage of the term multiplied by 
the standard deviation of the share price over (-250, -2) 
 
h
 Change in debt/equity ratio = post debt-equity ratio divided by pre debt-equity ratio.  
Equity is measured at book value 
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Warrants have the potentLDOWRJUHDWO\LPSDFWWKHILUP¶VFDSLWDOVWUXFWXUHLVDOOWKHLVVXHG
warrants are exercise, will on average increase the debt equity ratio by 56.6%. 
Meanwhile, the OTM and ITM warrants cause an average increase in debt equity by 
92.7% and 27.2% respectively. Thus, the results suggest that issuance of warrants will 
generally increase the leverage of firms, in which issuance of OTM warrants will result in 
greater LPSDFWRQILUP¶VFDSLWDOVWUXFWXUH 
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5. METHOLODOGY 
 
5.1 Event Study Methodology 
The announcement effect of warrant issues for capital rising is measured through event 
study approach. (Mackinlay, 1997). To get started, the first issue is to identify the event 
date, which can be used to separate between the pre-announcement and post-
announcement performance. This is the date on which the market learns about the 
relevant information. It has been shown that due to discrepancies and reporting delays 
among the news providers, in some occasions, identifying the exact moment of 
announcement is difficult (Seiler, 2004.)  
 
7R LGHQWLI\ WKHHYHQWGDWH ³Hong Kong practice is that warrants are given effect by a 
³EDVH OLVWLQJ GRFXPHQW´ SUHSDUHG DV DQ XPEUHOOD IRU DOO WUDQVDFWLRQV LQWURGXFHG WR WKH
H[FKDQJHE\DQ\VLQJOHLVVXHU´(Hong Kong Exchange Fact Book) Thus, the HKEx has 
to be notified of warrant issue before a public announcement is made to the media. The 
warrant announcement date selected is the date the warrant offer documents received 
by the HKEx. The HKEX tried to announce all new information on the date receiving the 
announcement, but given time constraints, preference was given to larger or highly 
traded firms. Thus, a delay may have occurred between the announcement date and the 
information reaching the market. Therefore, the event period is days 0 and 1 rather than 
days -1 and 0 in international studies. Such indirect announcement to the press and thus 
may have to allow for information leakage prior to the announcement. 
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An event window defines the number of trading days preceding and following the event 
date. The event window should be defined as exact as possible so as to ensure any 
irrelevant information, such as noise, will not affect the result of the test. (Seiler 2004.) 
This study records the announcement effect which is immediate, thus the length of event 
window takes into consideration 10 days before through another 10 days after the 
announcement. The event window covers twenty-one trading periods in total. This period 
of time can be considered long enough to examine the effect of possible leakage prior to 
the event date, as well as to find out how long it takes for the markets to fully incorporate 
the new information.  
 
After that, the estimation period is established as how the returns on the stock should 
behave in the absence of the event. In this study the estimation period is before the 
prior-event period in order to achieve an unbiased estimate of the firm performance, 
when the event is not happen.  
 
This study will use a 240 day estimation period, which can be considered to be a long 
enough period of time to define the relation between the markets and the firm. The 
estimation period will run ranging from 250 preceding the event window through eleven 
days before the event window. On the whole test covers 251 trading days with daily 
stock trading data used. Diagram 1 illustrates the time line for the estimation window and 
the event window.  
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Diagram 1: Time line for the warrant issues event study 
 
Hypothesis: 
Ho: The announcement of warrant issues do not induce abnormal return, AR=0 
H1: The announcement of warrant issues induce abnormal return$5 
 
5.2 Calculations of stock performance 
The returns of the warrants issue firms will be calculated subsequently. The paper 
calculates the returns as logarithmic returns, that is, the compound interests are taken 
into account for the return.  
1lnln  ttit PPR     (1) 
Where 
Rit = return for firm i at time t 
Pt  SUHVHQWGD\¶VFORVHSULFH 
Pt-1  SUHYLRXVGD\¶VFORVHSULFH 
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5.2.1 Expected returns and abnormal returns 
The normal return, defines as the expected return of firm as if the event had not happen. 
There are two common ways to set up the normal return model: the market and the 
constant mean return model. In the constant mean return model, mtR is treated as 
constant. This means the average return of security of specific firm is constant over time. 
In the market model  mtR  is the market return (Mackinlay, 1997). This model assumes 
that the market returns and the security returns of specific firm are linear. In this paper 
the market model has been chosen where this model assumes that the return of the 
market portfolio mtR  is related to a stock return.  
In the market regression model, the expected returns for each day are predicted from 
the statistics of the estimation period, 240 days prior to the event window, using a 
regression. Though the regression can be defined with more than one variable, studies 
have proven that a single-index model works with satisfying success. (Seiler 2004.)  
This thesis utilizes the most commonly used, market return method for determining the 
abnormal returns. What comes to some potential statistical problems, cross-sectional 
dependence does not form a problem because the announcement days are assumed 
QRW ³FOXVWHUHG´ 7KDW LV WKH HYHQW ZLQGRZV DUH ³UDQGRPO\ GLVSHrsed through calendar 
WLPH´%LQGHUHWDODQGVRWKHUHIRUPVFURVV-sectional independence among the 
events.  
Hence, instead of market portfolio we will use Hang Seng Index to calculate the return of 
market.  
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itmtiiit RR HED   
Where: )0(  itE H  and 2)( titVar HVH   
The residual difference for stock market share i is itH . 2tHV , iE and iD are the models 
parameters where iE is the regression coefficient. This means that iE measures the 
convariance between the market return and the return for stock market share i. (Eckbo, 
1983). The parameters of the ordinary least square (OLS) market are defined as follow: 
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Where L1 is the number of observed trading day returns for firm i over the estimation 
period, i
^P is the mean abnormal return for firm i at time t and m
^P is the mean return on 
the market at time t over the estimation period 
The normal return which is the expected return )( itRE  for stock market share i is thus 
calculated as:  
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mtiiit RRE
  ED)(   (2) 
Where its variance is calculated as: 
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Finally, the abnormal returns will be calculated by taking the actual return from the 
sample stock and deduct the predicted normal return for the days in the event window. 
(Mackinlay, 1997). 
Abnormal return ARit is given by: 
mtiiitit RRAR
  ED
  (3) 
Thus, the actual abnormal returns are to be calculated for each of the firms in the 
sample for every day during the event window.  
5.2.2 Statistical properties of abnormal return and the hypothesis 
According to Mackinlay (1997), several statistical properties of abnormal returns have to 
be considered. He states that under the null hypothesis, Ho, the event market returns 
and the abnormal returns will be jointly normally distributed with a conditional mean of 
zero. 
The variance of the abnormal return is calculated with respect to the event window: 
»»¼
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2
iHV is the residual variance of the market model regression and m
2V  is the variance of 
the market return itmtiiit RR HED  GXH WR WKH VDPSOLQJ HUURU LQ Į DQG ȕ 7KLV
sampling error is a common observation for all event windows, but it may lead to the 
problem of autocorrelation of the abnormal return even through the true distribution of 
abnormal returns are independent through time. Only if the length of estimation window 
1L  is large enough, the second component will approach zero and the sampling error of 
WKHSDUDPHWHUĮDQGȕZLOOEHYDQLVKHG7RGRWKLVWKHOHQJWKRIWKHHVWLPDWLRQZLQGRZ
1L ,  for the market model is choose to be 240 days prior to the event window, thus it is 
reasonable to assume that the second component has zero contribution to the variance 
of the abnormal return due to large 1L . Thus, the variance of the abnormal return will 
become 2
iHV  which is independent through time. (Mackinlay, 1997). 
Hence, ³if the null hypothesis holds and if the abnormal returns are independently 
identically distributed with finite variance, the test statistic is asymptotically normally 
distributed, the distribution properties of the abnormal returns can be used to draw 
inference over any SHULRGZLWKLQWKHHYHQWZLQGRZ´0DFNLQOD\ 
Therefore, the hypothesis for the sample distribution of abnormal return in the event 
window is:  
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5.3 Aggregate of abnormal returns across securities and through time 
 
The abnormal return of each individual firm is aggregated for the event window in order  
to draw overall inferences for the effect of warrant announcement.  (Mackinlay, 1997) 
It is assumed that the event windows of the included securities are not overlapped.  
Without overlapping of event window, the distribution assumption of the abnormal return  
will be independent across securities.   
 
We aggregateGLQGLYLGXDO ILUP¶VDEQRUPDOUHWXUQ$5it for each event period. Defining N 
as the number of announcement, we have 29 warrant financing announcements, the 
sample aggregated abnormal return is therefore calculated as: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¦
 
 
N
i
itt ARN
AR
1
1
 
¦
 
 
N
i
t iN
AR
1
2
2
1)var( HV  
One day standard error of AR = > @ 21^)var( tAR  
Test statistic for > @ 21^2 )var( t
t
AR
AR
AR   T
 
 45 
 
Then, the average abnormal returns are then aggregated over the event window to 
obtain the average cumulative abnormal return over the event window.  
 
³)RUWKHYDULDQFHHVWLPDWRUVWKHDVVXPSWLRQWKDWWKHHYHQWZLQGRZVRIWKH1VHFXULWLHV
do not overlap is used WR VHW WKH FRYDULDQFH WHUPV WR ]HUR´ 0DFNLQOD\  S
Thus, cumulative abnormal return follows:  
 
)),((,0(~),( 21221 ttCARNttCAR V  
 
Since the 2
iHV  is unknown, the sample variance measure of 2iHV from market model 
regression in the estimation window is chosen (Mackinlay, 1997). Using this to calculate 
var( AR ), Thus, the required equations are listed as follow: 
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5.4 Test for OLS: Autocorrelation and Stationary 
The market model is a single factor time series model for each firm. Thus, the market 
models based on 29 warrant announcements have been tested for autocorrelation (by 
Durbin Watson and LM test) and stationary (by Dickey fuller or Augmented Dickey fuller 
Test). The test results and the OLS regression results are shown in Table 4 below:  
Table 4:  Test Result for the Market Regression Model 
 
Sample 
No. 
Not  
Autocorrelated Stationary 
Coefficient 
Statistically 
significant 
1 No Yes Yes 
2 Yes Yes Yes 
3 Yes Yes Yes 
4 Yes Yes Yes 
5 Yes Yes Yes 
6 No Yes Yes 
7 Yes Yes Yes 
8 No Yes Yes 
9 Yes Yes Yes 
10 Yes Yes Yes 
11 Yes Yes Yes 
12 No Yes Yes 
13 Yes Yes Yes 
14 Yes Yes Yes 
15 No Yes No 
16 No Yes No 
17 Yes Yes No 
18 No Yes No 
19 No Yes Yes 
20 No Yes Yes 
21 Yes Yes Yes 
22 Yes Yes Yes 
23 No Yes Yes 
24 Yes Yes Yes 
25 Yes Yes Yes 
26 No Yes No 
27 No Yes Yes 
28 Yes Yes Yes 
29 No Yes Yes 
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6. ANNOUNCEMENT EFFECT OF WARRANT ISSUES  
 
The result of the announcement effect for warrant issues are shown in Table 5 (The t-
statistics values are compared with the t-critical values in Appendix 2). It shows the 
performance of stock returns induced by the warrant financing announcements. AR  
represent the average abnormal return of the sample warrant issues for the specified 
day in the event time and CAR  represents the correspondingly the average cumulative 
abnormal return for day -10 to the specified day.  
 
Since we are interested in the aggregate effect of both the average abnormal returns 
and the average cumulative returns, thus we further specific the period of CAR  
throughout the event window. We divided the event window into three segments: the pre 
announcement performance represented by CAR (-10, -1), the announcement date 
performance represented by CAR (0, +1) and the post announcement performance 
represented by CAR (+2, +10). The corresponding announcement returns results are 
shown in Table 6.  
 
For Diagram 2, it is constructed according to the average cumulative returns of warrant 
issues from day -10 to day +10. The OTM warrants demonstrate an upward trend of 
CAR  while the ITM warrants demonstrate a downward trend. The whole sample of 
warrants correspondingly shows no trend for the announcement return, which moves as 
wave pattern.  
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Table 5: Announcement Effects of the warrant issues over the event window (+10, -10). 
 
 All sample of warrants  Out of the money warrants  In the money warrants 
   
Number of samples 29  13  16 
One day standard 
error of AR 0.0089  0.0122  0.0127 
Event Day AR % Ĭ2 CAR % Ĭ3  AR % Ĭ2 CAR % Ĭ3  AR % Ĭ2 CAR % Ĭ3 
-10 0.891 1.001 0.891 1.001  1.506 1.235 1.506 1.235  0.391 0.307 0.391 0.307 
-9 1.935 2.173** 2.826 2.244**  -0.959 -0.787 0.547 0.317  4.287 3.364*** 4.678 2.596** 
-8 0.813 0.913 3.639 2.360**  0.286 0.234 0.832 0.394  1.241 0.974 5.919 2.682** 
-7 0.222 0.249 3.861 2.168**  0.720 0.591 1.552 0.637  -0.182 -0.143 5.737 2.251** 
-6 0.220 0.247 4.081 2.050*  0.641 0.526 2.194 0.805  -0.123 -0.096 5.614 1.970* 
-5 1.421 1.596 5.502 2.523**  0.704 0.578 2.898 0.970  2.004 1.572 7.618 2.441** 
-4 -1.825 -2.049* 3.677 1.561  -1.490 -1.222 1.408 0.436  -2.097 -1.645 5.521 1.638 
-3 -1.316 -1.478 2.361 0.938  -1.897 -1.557 -0.490 -0.142  -0.843 -0.662 4.678 1.298 
-2 -1.143 -1.284 1.218 0.456  0.721 0.592 0.232 0.063  -2.659 -2.086 2.019 0.528 
-1 -0.784 -0.881 0.434 0.154  -0.039 -0.032 0.193 0.050  -1.390 -1.091 0.630 0.156 
0 1.543 1.733* 1.977 0.669  1.895 1.555 2.088 0.516  1.257 0.987 1.887 0.447 
1 1.703 1.913* 3.680 1.193  5.011 4.111*** 7.099 1.681  -0.984 -0.772 0.903 0.205 
2 -0.756 -0.849 2.925 0.911  -0.357 -0.293 6.742 1.534  -1.080 -0.848 -0.177 -0.039 
3 0.254 0.285 3.178 0.954  2.139 1.755 8.881 1.947*  -1.278 -1.003 -1.455 -0.305 
4 0.361 0.405 3.539 1.026  -0.099 -0.082 8.781 1.860  0.734 0.576 -0.721 -0.146 
5 0.696 0.781 4.234 1.189  0.606 0.497 9.387 1.925*  0.769 0.603 0.048 0.009 
6 0.787 0.883 5.021 1.368  0.035 0.028 9.421 1.875  1.398 1.097 1.446 0.275 
7 -2.218 -2.491** 2.803 0.742  -2.068 -1.696 7.354 1.422  -2.340 -1.837* -0.895 -0.166 
8 1.042 1.171 3.845 0.991  0.796 0.653 8.150 1.534  1.242 0.975 0.347 0.063 
9 -1.516 -1.702 2.330 0.585  -0.612 -0.502 7.538 1.383  -2.250 -1.766 -1.903 -0.334 
10 1.372 1.541 3.702 0.907  1.232 1.011 8.770 1.570  1.486 1.166 -0.417 -0.071 
*Significant at 10% level             
**Significant at 5% level             
***Significant at 1% level             
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Table 6: Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns base on different segments 
throughout the event window. 
 
Performance Period 
 
 
Whole Sample of 
Warrants 
 
 
OTM 
Warrants  
ITM 
Warrants 
 CAR % Ĭ3  CAR % Ĭ3  CAR % Ĭ3 
CAR  (-10, -1)  0.434 0.154  0.193 0.050  0.630 0.156 
CAR  (0,+1)  3.247 2.578**  6.906 4.006***  0.273 0.152 
CAR  (+2, +10)  0.071 0.027  0.134 0.037  0.146 0.038 
*Significant at 10% level 
**Significant at 5% level 
***Significant at 1% level 
 
 
Announcement returns of Warrant Issues
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Event dates
CA
R%
Whole sample OTM ITM
 
Diagram 2: Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the Warrant Issues 
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6.1 Whole sample of warrants 
 
For the whole sample of warrants, the average abnormal return ( AR ) is positive and 
significant on days -9, 0 and +1 for the whole warrants sample. Given the one day 
standard error is 0.0089 for the whole sample, day 0 has an abnormal return of 1.54%, 
DQGWKXVWKHYDOXHRIș2 is 1.733. Similarly, the abnormal return on day +1 is 1.70% and 
day - LV WKH YDOXHVRI ș2 are thus 1.913 and 2.173 respectively. Both AR  of 
day -9, 0 and +1 are significant at the 5% and 10% level and therefore the null 
hypothesis of zero abnormal return for warrant issues is rejected.   
 
However, the whole sample shows a significant negative AR  on day -4 and day +7, 
which are -1.825% and -2.281%respectively. The average abnormal return results again 
reject the null hypothesis of zero abnormal return but gives no conclusion for the 
direction of abnormal return generated by an average Hong Kong warrant issues when 
the results are compared with the significant positive results of the day -9, 0 an +1 .  
 
Nonetheless, the announcement performance of the whole sample of warrants shows a 
positive average cumulative return ( CAR ) throughout the event window, through only 
the announcement date CAR (0, +1) performance is significant, while the pre and post 
announcement performance are insignificant. The announcement date performance,  
CAR  (0, +1), has a  significant CAR  of 3.25% with the vaOXHRIș3 is 2.578, which is thus 
significant at the 5% level and reject the null hypothesis of zero abnormal return.  
 
Combining the results, both AR  and CAR  shows a significant positive announcement 
returns on the announcement date (0, +1). We can conclude at least, on the 
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announcement date of warrant issues, these positive announcements return results are 
similar to the rights issues of equity in Japan, Finland and Norway but against the result 
in Australian and most international evidence which suggest that the right issue of equity 
generate negative announcement returns. The results, especially on the announcement 
date of warrant issues, consistent with the ideas of Schultz (1993) and Mayers (1998) in 
which they concluded that inclusion of warrant in financing reduces future agency and 
flotation costs and thus the market reacts positively to the warrant issue.  
 
6.2 Out of the Money Warrant Samples 
 
For the OTM warrants, it shows an even more significant and positive  AR  on day +1, 
compared to the whole sample of warrants. The AR  is 5.011% and is highly significant 
at 1% level, which rejects the null hypothesis of zero abnormal return. The significant 
positive abnormal return of OTM warrants occur immediately after the announcement 
date, it shows that people perceive firms signal positive information upon issuing OTM 
warrants and thus react positively to the warrants sold at premium.  
 
Furthermore, the OTM warrants sample demonstrate similar result as the whole sample 
of warrants in term of the average cumulative abnormal return, where the pre 
announcement, announcement date and post announcement performance of CAR  is 
positive throughout the event window but only the return of announcement date 
performance is significant. It shows that the announcement date CAR  is 6.906% and the 
value of Ĭ3 is 4.006, which again demonstrate a higher level of significance than that of 
the whole sample of warrants.  
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In short, the results from both AR and CAR suggests that the market in general react 
positively to the issuance of OTM warrants, It is again inconsistent with most 
international studies that equity issue response negatively by the market. The OTM 
warrant issues further drive the announcement effect for the whole sample. The result of 
the announcement return of warrant issues may be interpreted as suggested by Suchard 
(2005), the firm is currently undervalued and the managers who want to raise a small 
amount of capital to fund an exploration project would prefer issue warrants rather than 
issue undervalued equity in order to signal information. The market thus results in 
positive price rise on the announcement date. Thus, by issuing OTM warrants, the firm 
ties the capital inflow to favourable news related to capital need, which is consistent with 
Mayers (1998) sequential financing model.  
 
6.3 In the Money Warrant Samples 
 
For ITM warrants, it shows a significant positive AR on day -9 and a significant negative 
AR on day +7. The positive AR , 4.287%, on day -9 is  highly significant at 1% level with 
WKHYDOXHRIș2 is 3.364, rejecting the null hypothesis of zero abnormal return. Similarly, 
the negative AR , -RQGD\ LV VLJQLILFDQW DW  OHYHOZLWK WKH YDOXHRI ș2 is       
-1.837. Also, the pre-announcement, announcement date and the post announcement 
date performance of CAR are both positive, but insignificant. 
 
The results may suggest that information leakage exist prior to the announcement and 
people may react positively to the impending warrant announcements. The positive 
abnormal return does not persist after the announcement. It may due to the adverse 
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selection problem implied by the Myers and Majluf (1984), which suggest managers 
have incentives to issue overvalued stock and thus the market response negatively to 
equity issue announcement. The result of the ITM warrants consistent only partly to most 
studies that the market response negatively to equity issues because the post 
announcement performance, as suggested byCAR , is not in line with the general market 
view on equity issues.  
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7. THE REGRESSION ANALYSIS RESULTS 
 
7.1 The Cross Sectional Regression Model  
 
In order to find the factors affecting the announcement returns of warrant issues, we 
examine the determinants of the market reaction to the warrant issues announcements 
by means of cross-sectional regressions. In total, comprehensive data from 29 warrant 
issues announcement collected from 26 firms over the period June 2003 and December 
2009 are used.  
 
The regression model is adopted as follow: 
 
iiiiiiii LEVERAGEGROWTHPROBPRIORRISKISSUECAR HEEEEEEE  6543210
 
Where 
 
CARi   the cumulative abnormal return for firm i on day +1; 
ISSUE
 i   the magnitude of financing; defined as the gross proceeds of  
warrant issues divided by market value of equity of the firm. The 
gross proceed is calculated as the number of warrant issued 
multiplied by the warrant price. The market value of equity is 
calculated as the number of shares outstanding at last balance 
day (recorded in the offer documents) multiplies the closing price 
of shares the day before the announcement.   
RISK i the risk of the firm; defined as the standard derivation of the 
market model residuals over (-250, -61) 
PRIOR i  ILUP¶VSULRUSHUIRUPDQFHGHILQHGDVWKHFXPXODWLYHH[FHVVUHWXUQ
over (-60, -2) 
PROB i  the probability of conversion of the warrant issues; defined as  
the log of the share price over the exercise price as a percentage 
of the term to maturity of the warrant multiplied by the standard 
derivation of the share price over (-250, -2) 
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GROWTH i  the growth opportunities of firm; defined as market value of equity 
over book value of equity. Market value of equity is calculated as 
the number of shares outstanding at the financial year end pre the 
announcement multiplied by the closing price of the shares the 
day before the announcement. Book value of equity is calculated 
at the balance day pre the announcement. 
LEVERAGE i  the change in leverage of firm i; defined as post-announcement 
debt to equity ratio over the pre-announcement debt to equity ratio. 
Equity is measured at book value. 
 
7.2 Hypothesis for the explanatory variables  
 
The regression model tries to explain the announcement return based on information 
asymmetry hypothesis. It is set to estimate the warrant issues based on explanations 
proposed for equity issue. The null hypothesis is set opposite to the corresponding 
predicted explanatory variables. 
 
H1: ISSUE is negatively related to announcement returns 
The first variables, ISSUE, measures whether the magnitude of warrant issues will affect 
the LQYHVWRUV¶ perception of FRPSDQ\¶V current financial situation. In Miller and Rock 
(1985) information asymmetry model, he concluded that larger issue sizes of external 
financing are associated with more negative stock price reactions. Investors perceive 
large amount of issues as an implication of poor financial situation of firm. Alternatively, 
Myers and Majluf (1984) equity information asymmetry model also state that issue size 
(ISSUE) acts as a proxy for the amount of unfavorable information where the larger 
issue size would result in more negative share prices. Therefore, we expect the 
coefficient on ISSUE will be negative.  
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H2: RISK is negatively related to announcement returns 
According to Myers and Majluf (1984), there should be a negative relationship between 
the announcement and the risk of the firm.  Investors do not like new external financing 
announcement because they interpret it as unfavorable information of the intrinsic value 
RIILUP¶VDVVHW,QRUGHUWRSURWHFWDJDLQVWIURPSXUFKDVLQJRYHUYDOXHVHFXULWLHVLQYHVWRUV
will react negatively to those security offer new external financing announcement.   
 
Alternatively, the residual standard derivation of the market model can be interpreted as 
a proxy for information asymmetry (Krishnaswami et al, 1999). Krishnaswami (1999) 
assert that if managers have more information DERXW WKH ILUP¶V YDOXH WKDQ SRWHQWLDO
investors, they would prefer issues debt rather than equity because of lower contracting 
costs associated with adverse selection when dealing with better informed private 
lenders. Therefore, the greater the information asymmetry managers and investors, the 
greater the possibility of adverse selection and the more negative will be the share price 
response.  
 
H3: Prior performance (PRIOR) is negatively related to announcement returns 
According to Lucas and McDonald (1990), they find that the pre-announcement price 
performance is negatively correlated to the adverse selection effect of an equity offering.  
Managers know the appropriate time for equity offering, thus overvalued firms issue 
equity as soon as the opportunity arises, while undervalued firms postpone the equity 
issue until the stock price is higher. The undervalued firm will, on average, show an 
upward sloping price path and the overvalued firm will show a flat price path if the 
LVVXLQJRSSRUWXQLWLHVLVXQFRUUHODWHGZLWKWKHILUP¶VSULFHKLVWRU\Therefore, on average, 
the prior performance shows an upward price path and the greater the prior performance, 
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the higher potential for adverse selection and thus we expect the coefficient of PRIOR 
should be negative.  
 
H4: Probability of conversion (PROB) is either positively or negatively related 
to announcement returns 
The terms of right issue signals potential LQYHVWRUV DERXW WKH ILUP¶V SURVSHFW RI IXWXUH
cash flow. For example, Heinkel and Schwartz (1986) suggest that investors interpret a 
deep discount of exercise price as negative signal about the true value of the issue. The 
issuers would have a tendency to select a relatively low offer price relative to the market 
if they expect the price fall over the offering period. Therefore, the announcement of right 
offer with a greater discount on exercise price will cause more severe negative response 
on share price. Conversely, Kothare (1997) finds that low issue price reduces the 
possibility of information asymmetry as managers no longer benefit by using their 
superior information of the firm, and it reduces the probability of issuing overpriced 
shares compared to its intrinsic value and as a result, the announcement return 
increases with the level of discount.   
 
The level of issue discount is a proxy of the moneyness of the warrant issue. A number 
of factors such as the exercise price, time to maturity, and shares volatility both will 
affect the value of warrant. Thus, the probability of conversion is used as a measure of 
moneyness and is predicted the coefficient of PROB to be either positively or negatively 
related to the announcement returns. 
 
H5: GROWTH is positively related to announcement returns 
 58 
 
$PEDULVKHWDO µV HTXLW\ LQIormation asymmetry model also states that if a firm 
have new financing announcement, mature firm may response negatively in share price 
while a positive response would be result for growth firms. It is because mature firms 
have relatively less growth opportunities compared to growth firms. Besides, assuming 
the proceeds from warrant exercise are invested in positive NPV project rather than 
squandered, and then a firm with better growth opportunities should react less negatively 
to the announcement. Therefore, we would expect a positive coefficient on GROWTH. 
 
H6: LEVERAGE is positively related to announcement returns 
Ross (1977) and Heinkel (1982) both suggest that due to information asymmetry, the 
FKDQJHLQ OHYHUDJHFRQYH\VPDQDJHPHQW¶VH[SHFWDWLRQRI WKHIuture firm performance. 
They have concluded that the firms that issue shares will be significantly worse off 
compared to that issue convertible or straight debt if the expectation of the future firm 
performance is changed. Alternatively, Harris and Raviv (1990) and Stulz (1990) suggest 
agency cost problem exist and they predict that leverage is positively associated with 
firm value. The outside ownership increases result from an equity issue. The post 
announcement equity increases which may increase agency costs and therefore it would 
cause a negative impact on firm value. Thus, a positive coefficient of LEVERAGE would 
be expected. 
 
To summarize the hypothesis, there should be a positive relationship between 
GROWTH, LEVERAGE and announcement returns and a negative relationship between 
ISSUE, RISK, PRIOR and announcement returns. The relationship between PROB and 
announcement returns could be positive or negative.   
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7.3 Test for OLS Estimates 
7.3.1 Multicollinearity  
The regression model consists of more than one explanatory variable; therefore we have 
to determine whether the correlations between those explanatory variables are highly 
correlated because the existence of multicollinearity violates the assumption of OLS 
regression.  
 
From Correlation Matrix (Table 7), there is no any pair of explanatory variables with 
correlation greater than 0.75, thus inclusion of all 6 variables in the model are 
presumably will not cause multicollinearity.  
 
Table 7: Correlation of the explanatory variables 
 
Xi ISSUE RISK GROWTH PROB LEVERAGE PRIOR 
ISSUE 1 0.0628 -0.2813 -0.0824 0.2007 0.0176 
RISK 0.0628 1 0.1572 -0.0179 -0.1719 -0.5624 
GROWTH -0.2813 0.1572 1 -0.0571 -0.1617 -0.2219 
PROB -0.0824 -0.0179 -0.0571 1 -0.0526 -0.0182 
LEVERAGE 0.2007 -0.1719 -0.1617 -0.0526 1 0.0327 
PRIOR 0.0176 -0.5624 -0.2219 -0.0182 0.0327 1 
 
 
Tolerance value is the amount of variability in one explanatory variable not explained by 
other explanatory variable. It has inverse relationship with the Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF), thus it can be calculated as 1/VIF. The result is shown in Table 8. The higher 
value of 1/VIF implies the higher amount of variability in X not explained by other Xs. All 
the tolerance value of the variables is higher than 0.6, which suggest that 
multicollinearity problem is minimal or negligible.  
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Table 8: Tolerance Value and Variance Inflation Factor of the explanatory variables. 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
RISK 1.55 0.6469 
PRIOR 1.52 0.6559 
GROWTH 1.17 0.8542 
ISSUE 1.15 0.8699 
LEVERAGE 1.10 0.9063 
PROB 1.02 0.9818 
Mean VIF 1.25   
 
 
7.3.2 Heteroskedasticity 
Since the model is working on cross sectional data, we need to check the presence of 
heteroskedasticity to see if the variance of the error term is constant; otherwise, it 
violates the OLS regression assumption.  
H0 = Heteroscedasticity is not present, i.e. Homoscedasticity 
H1 = Heteroscedasticity is present 
The result from White test (Table 9) show that the p-value is greater than 0.05, we  do 
not reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity, that is, variance of the error term of 
the model is in line with the OLS regression assumption.  
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Table 9: Result of White Test 
 
                                                   
               Total        37.75     34    0.3018
                                                   
            Kurtosis         0.08      1    0.7818
            Skewness         8.79      6    0.1858
  Heteroskedasticity        28.88     27    0.3666
                                                   
              Source         chi2     df      p
                                                   
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
         Prob > chi2  =    0.3666
         chi2(27)     =     28.88
         against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity
 
 
 
7.4 Empirical Analysis and Result Discussion 
 
Table 10 shows the regression results of the cross-sectional regression model. The 
result if t-statistics are compared with the t-critical values as stated in Appendix 3. 
 
In terms of the warrants issue size (ISSUE), only ITM warrants consistent with the 
hypothesis, which shows a negative relationship to announcement returns and 
significant at the 10% level. The result of the in the money warrant issues is consistent 
with the signaling information asymmetry models of Miller and Rock (1985) and Myers 
and Majluf (1984). The ITM warrants issue at an exercise price lower than the current 
market price, may give an intuition of overvaluation of current share price. Further, the 
result suggests that the larger the issue size of the in the money warrants, the higher 
possibility that investors perceive it as unfavorable financial information of the company. 
and thus the more negative stock price reaction result. On the other hand, both the  
result of ISSUE from the whole sample and the OTM warrants model are inconsistent 
with that hypothesized but statistically insignificant.  
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Table 10: Cross-Sectional Regression Results 
 
Independent variables  Regression coefficient and t-statistics 
  
Whole sample 
warrants model 
 
OTM warrants 
model 
 
ITM warrants 
model     
          
  
ȕ t-stat  ȕ t-stat  ȕ t-stat 
ISSUE  0.475 0.750  1.924 1.400  -2.175 -1.670* 
RISK  4.361 2.480**  0.699 0.130  5.386 2.560*** 
GROWTH  0.003 0.150  0.045 0.990  -0.039 -1.250 
PROB  -0.459 -2.300**  -0.296 -0.710  -0.637 -2.650*** 
LEVERAGE  0.011 0.580  0.004 0.150  0.006 0.130 
PRIOR  0.365 1.880**  0.320 0.760  0.168 0.550 
Constant  0.365 -1.290  -0.446 -1.700*  0.210 0.870 
          
R-square  0.391   0.518   0.635  
F-stat  2.360   1.070   2.610  
*Significant at the 10% level        
**Significant at the 5% level        
***Significant at the 1% level        
 
 
In terms of the probability of conversion (PROB), both the whole sample warrants and in 
the money warrant issues show a negative and significant relationship to the 
announcement returns. The result consistent with the findings of Heinkel and Schwartz 
(1986) that potential investors perceive negatively about the true value of the issue, The 
in the money warrant issues are sold at discount and thus results in more severe 
negative response and higher level of significance compared to the whole sample 
warrants. The result PROB from the OTM warrants model also shows a negative 
relationship with the announcement returns, but the relationship is insignificant. 
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The result of the risk of the firm (RISK) is opposite to that hypothesized, results in a 
positive and significant relationship to the announcement returns. Since the explanation 
of the warrant issues act as a proxy of equity issues for external financing, unfavourable 
information or information asymmetry problem may not matters or useful in explaining 
the relationship with the use of warrants and announcement return.  The positive and 
significant announcement return relationship with risk may suggest that warrant issues 
by riskier firms are viewed positively by the market.  
 
 The proxy for adverse selection, the prior performance (PRIOR), of the whole sample of 
warrants is positively and significantly related to announcement returns. Through it is 
statistically significant; the result is inconsistent to that hypothesized based on 
information asymmetry assumption, suggested by Lucas and McDonald (1990) on the  
negative relationship between pre-announcement shares performance and the 
announcement return due to adverse selection. The positive and significant prior 
performance may indicate that companies come to raise equity after stock price run up. 
The result of PRIOR from the OTM and ITM warrants model are opposite to that 
hypothesized but insignificant.   
 
In general, the whole sample warrants model results support the information asymmetry 
models of Myers and Majluf (1984), Krishnaswami et al (1999), Heinkel and Schwartz 
(1986) and Kothare (1997), as proxied by risk of the firm (RISK) and probability of 
conversion (PROB), for Hong Kong equity warrant issues. Of the remaining variables, 
growth of firm and leverage are in the direction hypothesized although the relationship is 
not significant. Issue size and prior performance are opposite to that hypothesized, but 
the former is insignificant and the latter is significant. Thus, there is little support for 
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information asymmetry models based on optimal capital structure, agency cost models 
and in explaining the announcement effects of warrant issues in Hong Kong. The ITM 
warrants model has similar result as the whole sample where risk (RISK) and probability 
(PROB) are significant to explain the announcement effect. But in addition, the variant 
issue size (ISSUE) further support the information asymmetry models of Myers and 
Majluf (1984) and Miller and Rock (1985) in explaining the announcement effect of ITM 
warrant issues alone. Nevertheless, none of the variants based on information 
asymmetry hypothesis can explain the announcement effect of the OTM warrant issues.   
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8. LIMITATIONS 
 
8.1 Thinly trade problem 
A large proportion of the firms that issued warrants are severely thinly traded. Maynes 
and Rumsey (1993) argue that if a share does not trade daily, problems arise for both 
the estimation of expected returns models and the measurement of abnormal return. 
Also, if the return data is notoriously associated with non-synchronous trading, it will 
cause serial correlation in abnormal return which results in the breakdown of the most 
basic event study methodology assumptions (Brown and Warner, 1985).  
 
8.2 Parametric assumption  
The test applied in this paper is based on parametric assumption. Previous studies have 
shown that abnormal returns distributions show fat tails and are right skewed. Some 
findings states that parametric tests reject too often when testing for positive abnormal 
performance and too seldom when testing for negative abnormal performance. When 
the assumption of normality of abnormal returns is violated, parametric tests are not well 
specified. Non-parametric tests are well-specified and more powerful at detecting a false 
null hypothesis of no abnormal returns. 
 
8.3 Not standardized for abnormal return 
The individual firm and the average abnormal returns calculated are not standardized. 
Usually standardization is used to ensure that each abnormal return will have the same 
variance. Simply by dividing each firm¶s abnormal residual by its standard derivation 
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obtained over the estimation period, each residual has an estimated variance of 1. For 
certain alternatives, such standardization can lead to more powerful test (James Patell, 
1976).   
8.4 Clustering  
The analysis aggregating the abnormal returns has assumed that the event windows of 
the sample securities do not overlap. Thus, it might cause problems in the presence of 
event clustering, that is, the events are situated close to one another. The assumption of 
no overlapping of the event window allows the calculation of the aggregated sample 
cumulative abnormal returns without concern about the covariance across securities 
because they are zero. However, method is sensitive to the effect of event clustering 
and events close to one another will cause the covariance between abnormal return will 
not be zero and it may result in biased estimates.  
 
8.5 Market trend  
One should also take into account that market trends may corrupt the results. For 
instance, during bull markets, i.e. the stock markets are in an upward trend, the 
expected returns are higher than normally. The same can be reversed to match the bear 
markets, i.e. the markets are in a downward trend. The systematic risk caused by market 
trend may have influence on or even magnify the market response of the stock price and 
thus may alter the event study result.  
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9. SUMMARYS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper focuses on analyzing the announcement effect through the use of equity 
warrant as a capital raising instrument in Hong Kong market.  The Hong Kong market 
provides a contrast to other market in terms of operating and structural different. Hong 
Kong Firms issue equity warrant through rights issues, the price is set at announcement 
of the warrant issue and underwriting contracts are standby agreements. In terms of 
capital raising instrument, equity warrant is callable and extendable which can increase 
the control over the financial decision.  
 
The sample warrants are further divided into in the money and out of the money group, 
where there are a number of issue and issuer differences between the groups. In 
general, the OTM warrant issuers are categorize by having larger firm size, issue large 
size of warrants, have higher growth opportunities, result in larger change in leverage 
after warrant issue but proceed lower risk than that of ITM warrant issuers.  
 
The whole sample of warrant issues are met with a significant positive share price 
response which is in contrast to most of the equity rights issue evidence. The results on 
the announcement date (0, +1), concluded that the result is consistent with Schultz 
(1993) and Mayers (1998) where they concluded that inclusion of warrant in financing 
reduces future agency and flotation costs and thus the market reacts positively to the 
warrant issues announcement. The OTM warrant issues drive the announcement effect 
for the sample. The result of the announcement return of the OTM warrant issues has a 
positive response on share price. It consistent with Suchard (2005) suggests that the 
firm is currently undervalued and the managers who want to raise a small amount of 
capital to fund any exploration project upfront would prefer issue warrants rather than 
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issue undervalued equity in order to signal information. Further one can conclude that 
through the issuance of OTM warrants, issuing firm ties the capital inflow to favourable 
news related to capital need, consistent with Mayers (1998) sequential financing model.  
 
Furthermore, the results from regression analysis of the model developed based on the 
hypothesis of information asymmetry for Hong Kong warrant issues support the general 
and signaling information asymmetry result of the announcement returns, which is 
accounted by the variants risk (RISK) and probability of conversion (PROB). The ITM 
warrants model constitute similar result as the whole sample, and it further confirmed the 
information asymmetry by the variant issue size (ISSUE), in explaining the 
announcement effect of ITM warrant issues alone. However, none of the variables are 
significant to explain the announcement effect of the OTM warrant issues.   
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11.  APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: Warrant Issuers Details 
 
No. Industry Sector Company Name DS Code   Announcement Date 
1 Finance Sun Hung Kai Financial Service Limited 65289F 4/10/2006 
2 Consolidated Enterprise ITC Corporate Limited 2514QE 7/31/2008 
3  Willie International Holdings 1754JK 8/3/2007 
4 Properties China Overseas Land Investment 66717E 5/25/2006 
5  Allied Properties Limited 65465T 4/12/2006 
6  Heritage International 1884LV 11/7/2007 
7  Tian An China Limited 1881R2 10/2/2007 
8  Chun Wo Development Holdings Limited 84023U 1/3/2007 
9 Telecommunication COL Capital Limited 3709UR 4/10/2008 
10  Champion Technology Holdings Limited 90213H 10/23/2006 
11  Champion Technology Holdings Limited - 10/27/2005 
12  Champion Technology Holdings Limited - 10/29/2004 
13  China Solar Energy Limited 1803CD 12/18/2009 
14  China Solar Energy Limited - 9/3/2007 
15  Kantone Holdings 1776F1 10/26/2007 
16  Long Success International Limited 1990D6 11/6/2007 
17 Industrial PYI Corporate Limited 2389H4 7/23/2008 
18  China State Construction Limited 2056EJ 1/28/2008 
19  Sino-Tech International Holdings 1890T9 10/31/2007 
20  HKC Holdings 1837Q5 7/18/2007 
21  Tak Shun Technology Group 95560C 10/16/2006 
22  Man Yue International 1691D9 4/18/2007 
23  Man Yue International 1691D9 9/23/2004 
24  Topsearch International Holdings 65289H 4/6/2006 
25 Travel and Hotels Wing On Travel Limited (Rosedale Hotel) 2418U5 7/30/2008 
26  Regal Hoteld International Holdings 46000K 6/8/2004 
27 Miscellaneous Hop Hing Holdings 57424T 3/13/2008 
28  Playmate Holdings Limited 66717N 3/2/2006 
29  Culturecom Holdings Limited 1890T8 11/1/2007 
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Appendix 2: Critical t-value for Market Regression Model (Two-Tail Test) 
 
 
Market Regression Model 
Degree of 
Freedom 1% 5% 10% 
Whole Sample  23 2.807 2.069 1.714 
Out of the money warrants sample  7 3.499 2.365 1.895 
In the money warrants sample  10 3.169 2.228 1.822 
 
 
 
Appendix 3: Critical t-value for the Cross Sectional Regression Model (One-Tail 
Test)  
 
 
Cross Sectional Regression Model 
Degree of 
Freedom 1% 5% 10% 
Whole Sample  23 2.5 1.714 1.319 
Out of the money warrants sample  7 2.998 1.895 1.415 
In the money warrants sampe  10 2.228 1.812 1.372 
 
